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Abstract
Threat intelligence sharing is an important
countermeasure against the increasing number
of security threats to which companies and
governments are exposed.
Its objective is the
cross-organizational exchange of information about
actual and potential threats.
In recent years, a
heterogeneous market of threat intelligence sharing
platforms (TISPs) has emerged. These platforms are
inter-organizational systems that support collaborative
collection, aggregation, analysis and dissemination of
threat-related information. Organizations that consider
using TISPs are often faced with the challenge of
selecting suitable platforms. To facilitate the evaluation
of TISPs, we present a framework for analyzing and
comparing relevant TISPs. Our framework provides
a set of 25 functional and non-functional criteria that
support potential users in selecting suitable platforms.
We demonstrate the applicability of our evaluation
framework by assessing three platforms: MISP, OTX
and ThreatQ. We describe common features and
differences between the three platforms.

1.

Introduction

The adequate protection of information and
communication systems against threats constitutes
a major challenge for companies and governments.
Not only have attacks become more frequent (e.g. by
opportunistic malware), but they have also become
more targeted and complex (e.g. advanced persistent
threats) [1, 2]. The impact of these attacks on business
activities can be catastrophic and cause immense
damage. Companies and public authorities are well
advised to implement countermeasures against these
threats. This requires, besides other activities, gathering
and evaluating information about potential threats. Such
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threat-related information is also referred to as threat
intelligence (TI). We refer to TI as any evidence-based
knowledge, information or data about existing or
emerging threats that can be used for mitigation and
prevention [1]. Currently, most organizations carry
out the gathering and evaluation of TI individually,
with little to no cross-organizational exchange of
information. However, cross-organizational exchange
of TI is an important measure towards effective and
efficient threat detection and response [3].
To enhance cross-organizational communication
relating to TI, the concept of threat intelligence sharing
(TIS) has emerged.
It denotes the exchange of
information about actual and potential threats across
companies and public authorities [4–6]. A more
systematic and automated TIS improves the information
level of all parties involved [1]. Furthermore, TIS
enables organizations to collaboratively use their IT
security resources more efficiently. This helps to
reduce IT security costs [3, 7]. In recent years, a
heterogeneous market of so-called threat intelligence
sharing platforms (TISPs) has emerged.
These
platforms are inter-organizational systems that enable
companies and public authorities to collaboratively
collect, aggregate, analyze and share threat-related
information [8]. TISPs have become a useful tool
helping organizations to share TI more effectively.
However, performance levels and capabilities vary
greatly between platforms. Although several market
overviews and comparisons of TISPs have been
published, most of them are either incomplete or
not sufficiently transparent or are outdated [1, 9].
Organizations which consider using a TISP often face
the challenge of choosing a suitable platform that
meets their needs. Up to now, there is no framework
to adequately support the evaluation and selection of
TISPs.
The objective of this paper is to present a framework
for analyzing and comparing TISPs and to demonstrate
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its applicability. We address the following research
question: What are essential criteria to describe,
evaluate and compare TISPs?
To determine essential evaluation criteria for TISPs
we conducted a systematic literature review based on
both Webster & Watson [10] and Kitchenham [11].
Since the topic of TIS has only emerged in the last
decade, we considered papers published between 2008
and 2018. Using the results of the literature review,
we developed a framework for analyzing and comparing
TISPs. Finally, we demonstrated the applicability of the
framework by analyzing three exemplary TISPs. We
followed the design research approach proposed by [12].
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2
discusses related work. In section 3, we outline
the underlying research methodology to develop the
framework for evaluating TISPs.
In section 4
we demonstrate the applicability of the framework
by evaluating three TISPs and we describe salient
similarities and differences between these platforms. In
section 5 we discuss the limitations of the research at
hand. Section 6 concludes the paper and provides an
outlook on future work.

2.

Related Work

Research in the field of TIS can be classified in
five categories: opportunities and challenges, legal and
regulatory aspects, standardization efforts, aspects of
organizational integration of TIS and implementation of
TISPs [7].
Based on the concept of TIS described by
[8], several researchers focus on opportunities and
challenges of TIS. They describe sharing scenarios,
discuss advantages and disadvantages of TIS and present
requirements for effective and efficient TIS [1,4,13–15].
Other scholars focus on legal and regulatory aspects of
TIS [16, 17]. Several standardization efforts facilitate
the structured exchange of TI [5, 18–20]. Researchers
provide comprehensive overviews of these standards [7,
18, 21] and analyze how they overlap or differ [22–
25]. [26] introduces a taxonomy to evaluate and assess
TIS standards. Several studies focus on aspects of
organizational integration of TI and its impact on
organizational processes and decisions [27–30]. Based
on the standardization efforts and the concept described
by [8], several researchers, governmental institutions
and cyber security solution providers started with the
implementation of TISPs [8, 14, 31–34].
These
platforms provide functions for collecting, aggregating
and analyzing TI that can be disseminated to other
organizations via the platforms. [1, 9] provide an initial
overview and comparison of commercial and open

source platforms with a focus on customers’ demands.
However, the aforementioned comparisons of TISPs
lack a common evaluation framework and systematic
approach to describe, evaluate and compare TISPs.
Moreover, related work focuses only on a subset of
existing platforms. To the best of our knowledge,
no comprehensive framework for evaluating TISPs has
been published so far.

3.

Development of Evaluation Framework

The aim of this contribution is the development of a
framework to evaluate TISPs. Therefore, we conducted
a systematic literature review (see section 3.1). Based on
the results of our literature review, we propose criteria
and subcriteria for analyzing and comparing TISPs and
categorize them in our framework (see section 3.2).

3.1.

Systematic Literature Review

The objective of the literature review was to identify
and analyze publications that describe characteristics or
requirements for TISPs. The literature review, carried
out between April and September 2018, is based on
the methodologies proposed by [35] and [10]. We
applied the following procedure: definition of search
strategy and initial search, paper selection and criteria
extraction. To ensure reproducibility of the research
methodology, a review protocol was developed. It
includes the search strategy, search terms, selection
criteria, selection procedure, quality assessment and
data extraction. The complete literature review process
is shown in Figure 1.
Definition of Search Strategy and Initial Search.
To get an overview of TIS and TISP, we analyzed
eight publications [1, 4, 7–9, 15, 16, 33]. We then
defined the following two search strings for our
database search: [((cyber threat AND (intelligence OR
information OR knowledge)) OR (cyber security AND
(information OR data))) AND (sharing OR exchange)]
and [((cyber threat AND (intelligence OR information
OR knowledge)) OR (cyber security AND (information
OR data))) AND (platform OR service OR tool OR
system)]. The reason for the first search string is to
identify all studies related to TIS. The second search
string is used to identify all publications mentioning
TISPs. For a comprehensive literature search we used
the databases ACM Digital Library, AIS Electronic
Library, EBSCOhost, ELSEVIER ScienceDirect, IEEE
Xplorer Digital Library, GoogleScholar, Microsoft
Academic Search, Semantic Scholar, Springer Link,
Taylor & Francis Online, Web of Science and Wiley
Online Library. Depending on the database, we searched
for both search strings in the titles, abstracts, keywords
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and, if applicable, in the full texts. Only papers
published between 2008 and 2018 were considered. Our
initial search yielded 1,492 papers in total.
Paper Selection. We eliminated all duplicates and
excluded all papers that (i) were not available in full
text, (ii) had not been peer-reviewed or (iii) are gray
or white papers. By analyzing the title, abstracts and
keywords of all papers, we assessed their relevance for
answering our research question (see section 1). We did
not consider papers that do not provide answers to this
question. This selection procedure resulted in a set of
67 papers. In a subsequent step, four authors of this
paper classified each of the 67 papers as either relevant
or not relevant. Relevance in this context means that a
paper provides description criteria or requirements for
TIS or TISPs. The classifications of all four authors
were merged and compared. If all four authors classified
a paper as not relevant, we excluded it from the set of
papers. The result was a set of 46 relevant papers. They
were included in the review.
Criteria Extraction. For structuring and analyzing
the 46 papers, we defined a concept matrix. The concept
matrix consists of the following categories: description
criteria for TISPs, functional and non-functional
requirements for TISPs, names of TISPs, description of
TISPs, comparison of TISPs, discussion of strengths and
weaknesses of TISPs and standards. We split the set
of 46 papers into three subsets. Three of the authors
received one particular subset, while a fourth author
was assigned to the full list of papers. This technique
guaranteed that each paper was evaluated by at least two
researchers. We then excluded six further papers as they
contained no or only subjectively evaluable criteria or
requirements, e.g. usability of platforms. From the 40
remaining papers, we extracted a total of 62 criteria.

Figure 1. Systematic literature review process.

3.2.

Structure and Content of Framework

The considerable amount of extracted criteria
necessitated the introduction of apt aggregation and
categorization. To enhance the comprehensiveness
of the evaluation framework, the criteria were
sub-categorized. The resulting hierarchical construction
ensures a conceptually sensible grouping apt for vertical
and horizontal expandability. [36] suggests a framework
for the evaluation and selection of software packages
and software systems. According to this framework,
we distinguished between two categories, namely
functional and non-functional criteria. The framework
is shown in Table 1 and outlines all criteria (italicized),
subcriteria (in square brackets) and corresponding
references (last column).
In our context,
F UNCTIONAL C RITERIA
characterize the functions of a TISP. We distinguished
phases of TIS and cross-phase support.
Phases of TIS. We partitioned the TIS process into
four distinct phases: Collection, Aggregation, Analysis
and Dissemination of TI. These phases were derived
from current TIS process models and TIS activities as
described in the literature. [9], for instance, extracts the
phases of data collection, analysis and distribution from
the Intelligence Lifecycle Model; these three phases
are also mentioned by [9, 23, 38]. By contrast, [40]
considers aggregation a predominant TIS phase, as do
[7, 27, 37, 40, 40, 44]. [37] mentions all four TIS process
phases.
All phases share two common subcriteria: (i)
Available Functions details which functions a platform
provides to support a phase. Note that the retrieved
functions are stored in a list without any prioritization
(for exemplary functions, see Section 4).
(ii)
Degree of Automation describes whether the functions
work in a fully-automated, semi-automated or manual
manner. For example, functions within Collection of
TI [27, 39–42] can retrieve threat-related information
semi-automatically or functions within Analysis of TI
can perform risk analysis fully-automatically.
Analysis of TI [1, 2, 7, 9, 15, 39, 40, 44, 46, 47] is
further structured by the subcriteria Visualization and
Rating/Prioritization. The former expresses whether
analysis results can be displayed visually.
The
latter expresses options to rate or to prioritize TI to
demonstrate its relevance [6, 8, 14, 15, 38, 45, 47].
Dissemination of TI is further described by
Dissemination Mechanism and Real-Time Capacity.
The subcriterion Dissemination Mechanism denotes if
a push or pull approach is used to distribute incoming
TI [4, 7, 9, 20, 23, 26, 33]. In this context, push means
that the originator of TI disseminates the information,
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Table 1. Mapping of categories, subcategories, criteria and subcriteria to the literature.
F UNCTIONAL C RITERIA

Phases of TIS

Cross-Phase
Support

Collection of TI [Available Functions, Degree of
Automation]
Aggregation of TI [Available Functions, Degree of
Automation]
Analysis of TI [Available Functions, Degree of
Automation, Visualization, Rating/Prioritization]
Dissemination of TI [Available Functions, Degree of
Automation, Dissemination Mechanism, Real-Time
Capacity]

[9, 16, 23, 27, 37–42]

Information Security [Available Functions]
Data Privacy [Available Functions, Supported
Countries/Federations]
Data Quality [Available Functions]

[5, 9, 13, 15, 33, 34, 47, 49]

Trust [Available Functions]
Import & Export [Available Functions, Supported
Import and Export Standards]
Collaboration [Available Functions, Anonymity
Levels, Exchange Channels]
Reporting [Available Functions, Filtering, Form]

[2, 7, 27, 37, 43, 44]
[1, 2, 6–9, 14, 15, 23, 37–40, 44–47]
[4, 7, 9, 15, 16, 20, 23, 26, 29, 33, 37, 38, 48]

[7, 9, 13, 15, 16, 47]
[1, 2, 4–8, 13, 14, 16, 27, 29, 49]
[2, 5, 6, 9, 13, 15, 16, 27, 29, 33, 47, 49, 50]
[1, 9, 13, 14, 38]
[1, 2, 6–9, 13, 15, 29, 33, 39, 49, 51, 52]
[1, 2, 9, 14, 26, 27, 29, 38, 39, 44, 46, 51]

Additional Functions
N ON -F UNCTIONAL C RITERIA
Type of Platform
Architecture &
Interfaces

Architecture
APIs [Type of APIs, Supported IT Systems]
User Interface [Type, Languages]

[1, 7, 24, 41]
[4, 9, 16, 20, 24, 26, 37]
[1, 7, 14, 44]
[7–9, 33, 39, 42]

Content &
Standardization

Data Origin [Number of Internal and External
Sources, Type of External Data Sources]
Threat Intelligence [Content Type, Content Form,
Content Language]
Standardization [Description Standards, Exchange
Protocols, Standard Extensions]

Provider &
Users

Provider [Sector, Location, Organization Size, Role]
Users [Sector, Location, Organization Size, Number
of Users, Number of Active Users]

[5, 6, 23, 37, 48, 50–52]

Usage Fees [Non-Recurring, Recurring]
Usage Fees, License
& Distribution

License
Geographical Focus

[1, 4, 5, 9, 23, 52]
[1, 4, 9, 23, 52]
[5, 7, 41, 51, 54]
[5, 39, 48, 54]

Sectoral Focus

while pull means that the platform user launches the
dissemination. Real-Time Capacity details if TI can be
shared in real time [7, 15, 16, 29, 37, 38, 47, 48].
Cross-Phase Support. In this subcategory we
summarized functions which encompass more than one
phase (or even span over the whole TIS process). All
criteria listed in this subcategory are expanded by the
subcriterion Available Functions.
Information Security denotes whether the
platform provides functions or measures to
protect confidentiality, integrity and availability
of information and services provided by the TISP
[5, 9, 13, 15, 22, 33, 47, 49], e.g. encryption mechanisms
to guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of TI.
Data Privacy and Data Quality cover functions
enforcing a platform’s data privacy and data quality

[4, 7, 15, 16, 38, 43, 48, 53]
[1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 19, 37, 41]
[1, 2, 4, 5, 7–9, 13–16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 33, 34, 40–
48, 50, 51, 53, 54]

[5, 7, 29, 33, 39, 50, 52]

rules.
Lacking privacy may prevent users from
accepting TISPs [7, 9, 13, 15, 16, 47]. As data privacy
regulations may vary between countries, the subcriterion
Supported Countries/Federations was added. Data
Quality specifies the usage of control mechanisms to
ensure a certain degree of data quality provided by the
platform [1, 2, 4–8, 13, 14, 27, 29, 49].
Considering the vast increase in available TI, more
attention should be paid to estimate its potential validity.
Building on the aforementioned reluctance of users to
accept TI, we introduced the criterion Trust. Examples
for functions are reputation mechanisms or mechanisms
for creating an Information Exchange Policy [13].
Focusing on integration aspects, Import & Export
describes the functions for importing and exporting
content provided by the platform [1, 9, 13, 14, 38].
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Standards supported by the platform are of particular
importance here.
Collaboration between platform users is an essential
feature of TISPs [8, 9, 29]. It denotes functions
supporting cooperation of platform participants. This
criterion is further structured by Anonymity Levels and
Exchange Channels. The former subcriterion describes
how users can participate in collaboration processes
supported by the platform, i.e. anonymously, using a
pseudonym or publicly [6, 9, 49–51]. The latter denotes
whether the platform provides options to collaborate
privately, publicly or in communities [1, 7–9, 13, 15, 33,
52].
Reporting covers the provision of reporting
mechanisms, such as the generation of reports for
information security risk management, e.g. according
to the ISO/IEC 27001 standard [55]. The subcriteria
Filtering and Form indicate options to customize reports
with filtering options or selecting between a visual or
textual format. To list any further salient functions, we
introduced the criterion Additional Functions.
We divided N ON -F UNCTIONAL C RITERIA into
four subcategories, namely Architecture & Interfaces,
Content & Standardization, Provider & Users and Usage
Fees, License & Distribution.
Architecture & Interfaces.
This subcategory
characterizes the platform’s architecture and interfaces.
We distinguished four criteria: Type of Platform,
Architecture, APIs and User Interface. Type of Platform
describes two types of TISP instances: operational
platforms and software to build a platform [1, 7,
24, 41].
The former enables users to utilize a
fully-fledged platform, including TIS services and an
existing community. The latter offers users a software
solution upon which a platform and corresponding
functionalities can be built.
Architecture specifies the architectural concept upon
which the platform is based. This criterion was partially
derived from [20], mentioning three exchange models
for TIS [20]: (i) Client-Server (ii) Peer-to-Peer (iii) Hub
and Spoke [4, 9, 24, 26, 37].
APIs describes interfaces to integrate the platform
into an organization’s IT infrastructure, detailed in
subcriteria Type of APIs and Supported IT Systems
[1, 7, 14, 44]. The former describes all APIs offered
by the platform. The latter lists IT systems, e.g.
risk and vulnerability management systems or incident
management systems, which can be integrated into the
platform.
User Interface is described in more detail using
Type and Languages [7–9, 33, 39, 42]. The subcriterion
Type specifies if the platform provides a graphical user

interface (GUI) or a command line. The subcriterion
Languages lists all languages in which the user interface
is available [7].
Content & Standardization. This subcategory
details the content provided and the standards used
by the platform. Data Origin describes the sources
of data used to produce TI. [53] distinguishes
internal, public and commercial data sources, [48]
differentiates between internal, public and community
sources. Similarly, [4] distinguishes internal, external
and community sources. [43] and [15] synthesize the
aforementioned categories into internal and external
data sources. We used the subcriteria Number of
Internal Sources and Number of External Sources [4,
15, 16, 43]. Internal sources provide data that are
generated directly by the platform provider or platform
users. External sources provide data that are generated
from third parties [38]. [7] further differentiate external
data sources into public or commercial data feeds. We
followed this distinction and introduced the subcriterion
Type of External Sources.
Threat Intelligence is subdivided into three
subcriteria: Content Type, Content Form and Content
Language. First, Content Type specifies the objects
described by the platforms [1, 2, 7, 9, 19, 37]. Object
types may range from Indicators of Compromise (IoC),
represented by an IP address, to fully fledged attack
scenarios called Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(TTP). Second, Content Form describes whether TI is
available in a structured format (e.g. via specified data
structures) or in an unstructured (e.g. textual) form [6].
Third, Content Language denotes the languages in
which TI is expressed.
Standardization details which standards and
protocols are supported by the platform. Note that
almost all papers we evaluated in detail discuss the use
of standards relating to TISPs. We used the subcriteria
Description Standards, Exchange Protocols and
Standard Extensions. The first two subcriteria specify
which description standards and exchange protocols the
platform supports, e.g. Structured Threat Information
eXchange (STIX) and the Trusted Automated eXchange
of Indicator Information (TAXII) [19, 20, 56]. Standard
Extensions indicates whether the platform has published
extensions to standards [53].
Provider & Users. This subcategory describes the
parties involved in the provision and usage of the TISP.
Provider and Users both share the subcriteria Sector,
Location and Organization Size. The subcriterion Sector
describes the industrial sector of the provider [5, 6,
23, 48, 51, 52]. Sectors are described following the
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC),
which differentiates between 21 distinct categories [57].
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Location details the country in which the provider
resides. Organization Size describes the size of the
provider (small, medium or large organization) [58].
Provider is further specified by the subcriterion Role.
It details if the provider uses the platform or if he
acts as an intermediary [37, 50]. Users are described
with similar subcriteria: Sector [7, 33, 39, 50], Location
[52] and Organization Size. Additionally we used the
subcriteria Number of Users and Number of Active Users
[5,29,33,50]. An active user is a user who regularly uses
the platform.
Usage Fees, License & Distribution. The last
subcategory covers several business aspects of a TISP.
Usage Fees describes fees charged for the use of the
platform. It may be detailed into Non-Recurring and
Recurring fees [1, 4, 5, 9, 23, 52]. License describes
if the platform’s source code is publicly available
(open source) or if it is a proprietary software (closed
source). Geographical Focus specifies the platform’s
geographical focus (regional, national, international,
global) [5, 7, 41, 51, 54]. Sectoral Focus describes
whether the platform targets a specific industrial sector
or has a multi-sector focus [5, 39, 48, 54].

4.

Demonstration of Evaluation
Framework

As part of our literature review (see section 3.1) and
an extensive web search, we identified 35 TISPs. We
excluded platforms from our study for which we could
not find detailed information.We applied the evaluation
framework to a total of ten TISPs, three of which will
be described in section 4.1. For reasons of brevity,
the platforms will be presented in a succinct manner to
highlight similarities and salient differences (see section
4.2).

4.1.

Selected Platforms

MISP. The Malware Information Sharing Platform
(MISP) is an open source platform funded by the
European Union and the Computer Incident Response
Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) [33, 59]. All four phases
of the threat intelligence sharing process are supported
by the platform: Collection of TI is enabled by the
import of feeds and the option to produce TI for platform
users. Aggregation of TI is achieved by using several
functions (e.g. Fuzzy hashing or CIDR block matching).
TI analysis can be conducted in groups and can yield
visual results. Automated pull and push methods are
provided to disseminate the resulting TI (e.g. in form
of STIX or other textual formats). Information security
measures are enforced according to ISO 27000, whereas
data privacy measures are implemented according to the

General Data Protection Regulation [60]. Collaboration
can be supported either pseudonymously or publicly,
with trust groups as a further means to team up.
The supported import standard is Open Indicators of
Compromise (OpenIOC), whereas both OpenIOC and
STIX are listed as export standards. Interestingly, no
details on data quality or reporting mechanisms are
published on the platform. It is possible to equip
the platform with various additional functions with the
help of expansion modules. We classified MISP as
an operational platform; however, it is also available
as a software to build a platform. MISP provides an
API for integrating the platform into security systems
(e.g. into the intrusion detection systems Snort or
Suricata) and a web-based user interface (English only).
The content provided by MISP originates from internal
sources created by platform users and 55 further public
feeds (external sources). TI is provided in the form of
IoC available both in structured (STIX and OpenIOC)
and unstructured formats (English only). Various
modules are available for exchanging TI, one of which
supports the exchange protocol TAXII. No information
about standard extensions is provided. The platform
provider CIRCL uses the platform as part of its internal
IT security management. Using the platform is free
of charge and the platform’s source code is publicly
available. The platform does not belong to any sector.
Users currently include 800 organizations worldwide.
OTX. Labeled the ”world’s largest open threat
intelligence community” [61], Open Threat Exchange
(OTX) is run by AT&T Cybersecurity, a subsidiary of
AT&T Communications with headquarters located in
the US. The platform supports three phases of the TI
sharing process: The collection of TI occurs (either
manually or in a semi-automated manner) via so called
pulses which contain entries on TI. Various functions
for TI aggregation are mentioned on the platform,
however, no insights into concrete functions are given.
By contrast, analysis procedures are outsourced to
AT&T Cybersecurity TI experts who test, evaluate
and reprocess the provided TI. Subsequent distribution
occurs through the OTX DirectConnect API either in
an automated push manner or a manual pull manner.
Both mechanisms support information sharing in real
time. Information security measures are enforced by
taking ”reasonable precautions”, whereas data privacy
is ensured by a privacy policy that is in conformity with
the legal regulations of numerous countries (including
the US, EU and several other European countries).
Collaboration can happen anonymously or publicly
either within forums or comment sections. Trust can,
among other measures, be built by voting pulses up and
down. This influences the reputation of pulse producers.
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STIX serves both as the supported import and export
standard. OpenIOC is also listed as supported export
standard. Data quality functions are not described
in detail, however, the provider states that means to
ensure data quality are implemented internally. OTX
provides means to report on TI events on a dashboard.
We classified OTX as an operational platform. OTX
provides an API (called DirectConnect) for integrating
the platform into existing systems. The provider lists
29 supported IT systems. OTX offers a graphical user
interface (English only). Little to no information is
provided about the origin of the data sources. The
provider states that in addition to the internal TI,
selected public feeds and commercial data sources are
included. OTX also uses honeypots that are operated
by the provider as data sources. TI is provided in
both structured and unstructured form, ranging from
Common Vulnerability Exposures (CVE) and IoC to
high-level summary reports about threats. STIX is
listed as a description standard, whereas TAXII is used
as an exchange protocol. AT&T Cybersecurity uses
the platform for its own Unified Security Management.
OTX is part of the information and communications
sector. Currently, over 100,000 individuals and 7,000
organizations are registered as users. Given that the
platform is open source, neither usage nor license fees
are charged. The platform offers its services worldwide
and has a cross-sector orientation.
ThreatQ. Developed and maintained by the
US-based company ThreatQuotient Inc., ThreatQ is
described as an ”open and extensible threat intelligence
platform that accelerates security operations through
streamlined threat operations and management” [62].
The platform supports all four phases of the TI
process, but discloses only few details of the supported
functions. The collection process encompasses the
import of information provided by internal and external
sources. Aggregation is achieved by functions that
enable automatic combination, normalization and
contextualization of threat data.
Several analysis
functions are listed, including the analysis of phishing
attacks and adversary tracking. Distribution is enabled
by automated push methods (i.e. sending specific
actions, rules or signatures to network and end point
security solutions). Information security measures
are enforced according to ”appropriate technical and
physical safeguard measures”. However, they are
not described in detail. Data privacy is guaranteed
according to an US-based privacy policy, which is also
mentioned as a means to build trust. The supported
import standards are STIX and OpenIOC, whereas only
STIX is listed as an export standard. Collaboration
is facilitated by the formation of cross-organizational

teams. We could not discern any details on data quality
functions and reporting mechanisms. ThreatQ offers a
Software Development Kit (SDK) for customizing and
extending the platform’s functionalities. We classified
ThreatQ as an operational platform which provides an
API and standard interfaces to be connected to existing
security systems as well as ticketing systems. The
platform also offers a graphical user interface (English
only). Besides utilizing an internal TI data source,
ThreatQ uses over 100 public and 49 commercial
data sources. The TI content type is STIX as are the
resulting artifacts; it thus includes both structured
and unstructured contents (English only). Description
standards encompass STIX and OpenIOC. TAXII
is mentioned as an exchange protocol. We could
neither identify the number of users nor details about
the platform’s role (except that it is located in the
information and communications sector). Platform
users pay an annual fee. ThreatQ aims at customers
worldwide. It has no industrial sector focus.

4.2.

Similarities and Differences of the
Platforms

The investigation of the three TISPs revealed
some interesting similarities. We observed that all
platforms intensively support the collection, aggregation
and dissemination of TI; however, this is not the
case for the analysis of TI. All platforms offer
functions for enhancing information security, data
privacy, collaboration, trust and import & export of TI.
Moreover, all provide one or more APIs for integrating
the platform into an organization’s IT infrastructure. All
three platforms offer a graphical user interface. All
platforms not only rely on internal data sources, but
process a wide range of external data sources. Another
common feature is that all platforms mainly use the
following three standards: STIX, TAXII and OpenIOC.
Interestingly, all three providers use their own platform
as an element of their internal IT security management,
i.e. they are not only intermediaries but benefit from
the TI generated by their customers. Last, all providers
make their platform available worldwide and have no
industry sector focus.
We have discerned significant differences between
the TISPs described in section 4.1, both on a functional
as well as on a non-functional level. While the general
support of the phases of TIS between platforms is
similar, their functional scope in the individual phases
differs considerably. ThreatQ, for example, offers
substantially more sophisticated aggregation functions
than the two other platforms.
This significantly
influences the later analysis of TI. The three platforms
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have two fundamentally different approaches for
analyzing TI. OTX, for example, outsources measures
to analyze TI to designated specialists, i.e. analysis
functions are not processed by the platform. This means
that standard functions for analyzing TI are missing on
the platform. In contrast, MISP and ThreatQ take a
different approach: TI is analyzed on the platforms and
can be collaboratively examined by platform users or
in user groups to yield vital results. These different
approaches entail that the resulting TI which is to
be distributed varies considerably in both content and
expressiveness. There are also substantial differences
in cross-phase functions, especially relating to data
quality and reporting functions. Reporting is supported
by non-customizable dashboards or individual threat
reports. Only OTX offers more comprehensive reporting
functions which also allow individualization, as well
as various textual and visual reports. OTX is the only
platform that states that it takes internal measures to
ensure data quality.
Analyzing non-functional criteria also revealed a
wide range of differences. Although all three platforms
are operational platforms, MISP is also offered as
software for building individual platforms.
The
number of external data sources used to generate
TI is another significant difference between the three
platforms. ThreatQ, for example, uses more than
three times as many external data sources as MISP
does. There are also salient differences in the content
provided by the platforms. MISP focuses primarily on
IoC, whereas ThreatQ and OTX provide information
about Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and
high-level summary reports about threats (so-called
tactical, operational and strategic TI [3]). There are also
significant differences in the number of platform users:
whereas OTX has 7,000 participating organizations,
MISP only has 800.

5.

Limitations

The research at hand might be limited by a selection
and classification bias of relevant publications. In
order to counteract this, we ensured that at least two
authors selected and classified each paper. Moreover,
the framework might be limited by an incomplete
list of evaluation criteria since we only considered
academic literature. Given that our approach relies
solely on academic sources, it partially includes a
practical perspective, as some of the papers based their
results on empirical investigations (e.g. [27]). Still, the
application of the evaluation framework showed that
it seems to cover the majority of relevant criteria of
a TISP. In this context, it is worth mentioning that

the research at hand might be limited by the small
subset of TISPs we considered for the application of the
framework. This limitation can be justified by space
limitations and our intention to primarily demonstrate
the applicability of the framework. Thereby, we tried to
select a representative set of platforms, namely an open
source TISP, the largest publicly available TISP and a
commercial TISP. Since we had full access to each TISP
we comprehensively analyzed and evaluated these three
TISPs. Furthermore, we had to extract information from
provider websites and technical reports, which again
could have biased our research.

6.

Conclusion

In this paper we introduced an evaluation framework
to analyze and compare current TISPs, which is of
potential interest to both research and practice. It
provides a basis for a common understanding of
TISPs and thus supports the description, analysis
and evaluation of these platforms. We developed
the evaluation framework based on requirements and
characteristics of TISPs derived from a set of 40 papers.
To identify these papers, we conducted a literature
review in which an initial set of 1,492 papers was
analyzed. We demonstrated the applicability of the
evaluation framework by analyzing three representative
TISPs, including (i) MISP, (ii) OTX and (iii) ThreatQ.
Our demonstration of the evaluation framework showed
that the evaluation criteria and subcriteria specified
in the framework allow a detailed description and
comparison of TISPs. Commonalities, but also many
differences between the three platforms could be
presented comprehensively and systematically. Future
work includes a comprehensive evaluation of the
framework according to [12]. In doing so, we plan
to conduct case studies with organizations selecting
TISPs and ask experts to assess the completeness and
applicability of the framework. By conflating academic
and industry-based resources, the framework will
become more balanced and robust. Moreover, our future
work will focus on a comprehensive evaluation of all
available TISPs, together with establishing a weighting
of criteria and functions within the framework. The
latter will add valuable granularity to our framework,
and will render it more expressive.
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A. Doupé, G.-J. Ahn, and P. Black, “Towards automated
threat intelligence fusion,” in Collaboration and
Internet Computing (CIC), 2016 IEEE 2nd International
Conference on, pp. 408–416, IEEE, 2016.
[38] S. Qamar, Z. Anwar, M. A. Rahman, E. Al-Shaer,
and B.-T. Chu, “Data-driven analytics for cyber-threat
intelligence and information sharing,” Computers &
Security, vol. 67, pp. 35–58, 2017.
[39] T. Sander and J. Hailpern, “Ux aspects of threat
information sharing platforms: An examination &
lessons learned using personas,” in Proceedings of
the 2nd ACM Workshop on Information Sharing and
Collaborative Security, pp. 51–59, ACM, 2015.
[40] G. Settanni, Y. Shovgenya, F. Skopik, R. Graf,
M. Wurzenberger, and R. Fiedler, “Acquiring cyber
threat intelligence through security information
correlation,” in Cybernetics (CYBCONF), 2017 3rd
IEEE International Conference on, pp. 1–7, IEEE, 2017.
[41] R. Lewis, P. Louvieris, P. Abbott, N. Clewley,
and K. Jones, “Cybersecurity information sharing:
a framework for sustainable information security
management in uk sme supply chains,” 2014.
[42] G. Lodi, L. Aniello, G. A. Di Luna, and R. Baldoni,
“An event-based platform for collaborative threats
detection and monitoring,” Information Systems, vol. 39,
pp. 175–195, 2014.
[43] M. Bromiley, “Threat intelligence: What it is, and how to
use it effectively,” SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room,
2016.
[44] D. Shackleford, “Who’s using cyberthreat intelligence
and how,” SANS Institute, 2015.
[45] J. L. Hernandez-Ardieta, J. E. Tapiador, and
G. Suarez-Tangil, “Information sharing models for
cooperative cyber defence,” in CyCon, pp. 1–28, 2013.

[49] S. Murdoch and N. Leaver, “Anonymity vs. trust
in cyber-security collaboration,” in Proceedings of
the 2nd ACM Workshop on Information Sharing and
Collaborative Security, pp. 27–29, ACM, 2015.
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